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Antitrust enforcement makes it difficult to test theories of cartel formation because most 
attempts to form cartels are blocked. However, federal laws allow U.S. produce growers 
to operate marketing cartels through devices called marketing orders. These cartels use 
quantity controls and quality standards to raise prices on fresh produce. Some growers 
have adopted marketing orders and others have not. This paper develops and tests a 
positive theory of the adoption of marketing orders. The theory suggests that growers in a 
region are more likely to adopt a marketing order if the demand for fresh produce is 
inelastic, the growers’ market share in the fresh market is large, there are barriers to entry 
and expansion, the fraction of the output the growers ship to the fresh market is not too 
large or too small, growers are homogeneous, and large cooperatives exist. Probit 
analyses support these hypotheses. 
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“Man sensibly tries to collude to avoid costly competition.” Armen A. Alchian (1977). 
 
“... [C]ollusion is impossible for many firms, and collusion is much more effective in  
some circumstances than in others.” George J. Stigler (1964). 
 
Over two hundred years ago, Adam Smith noted that meetings between “people of the 
same trade” tend to beget “some contrivance to raise prices.”
1 This tendency to collude is 
to be expected - rational, profit-maximizing sellers quite naturally attempt to escape the 
competitive pressures that reduce their prices and profits.
2 However, while the desire to 
collude may be universal, the ability to collude is not nearly so widespread, for Stigler 
reminds us that “collusion like most other things in this world, is not free” and that “if 
any member of the agreement can secretly violate it, he will gain larger profits than by 
conforming to it.”
3 Thus, any contrivance to collude will be ineffective unless the 
colluders can detect and deter defectors. Government antitrust enforcement inhibits most 
attempts to deter defectors and therefore greatly limits the effectiveness of collusion in 
most industries. Accordingly, government antitrust enforcement inhibits most attempts to 
examine the benefits and costs of collusion as well as the circumstance under which 
collusion is observed. This paper examines a set of legal cartels - marketing orders in the 
United States’ fresh produce industry - to investigate how producers reconcile their 
disparate interests in reaching an agreement to collude and what factors facilitate or 
impede collusion. The Capper-Volsted Act of 1922 awarded both tax-exempt status and antitrust 
immunity to agricultural cooperatives. Likewise, since its passage in 1937, the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (the Act) has enabled growers of fruits, nuts, and 
vegetables to decide how much and what quality of their produce to sell on the fresh 
market. Whenever a two-thirds majority of growers within a region, by number or by 
volume, can agree to a set of marketing restrictions, the Act authorizes the Secretary of 
Agriculture to declare these restrictions legally binding on all distributors of the crop 
within the region. As formal agreements designed to reduce competition, marketing 
orders operate as government-enforced cartels.
4 
In 1995, 35 active marketing orders regulated the distribution of fresh fruits, nuts, 
and vegetables in the United States. While a few orders had been established since 1980, 
most had been operating for over 40 years.
5 We use an interest group approach to 
examine these cartels. The theory presented in the next section generates several testable 
hypotheses about cartel formation. Growers in a region are more likely to form a cartel if 
the demand for fresh produce is inelastic, the growers’ market share in the fresh market is 
large, there are barriers to entry and expansion, the fraction of output the growers ship to 
the fresh market is not too large or too small, growers are homogeneous, and large 
cooperatives exist. In Section III we test the hypotheses using several probit models and 
find support; Section IV concludes. 
 
II.  AN INTEREST GROUP THEORY OF MARKETING ORDERS 
 
Marketing orders evolved as an instrument to facilitate collusion, but collusion need not 
be profitable for all growers.
6 Among themselves, growers must reconcile disparate and often conflicting interests, and there are several examples of proposed orders being 
turned down and existing orders being abandoned. For example, proposed marketing 
orders for California melons, lettuce, and apricots have never survived a referendum. 
Disagreements over quality standards moved grapefruit growers in California and 
Arizona to abandon their marketing order. Meanwhile, Texas lettuce and melon growers 
and Washington apricot growers have used marketing orders for decades. 
We develop a theory that predicts the characteristics of growers that enable them 
to successfully collude through marketing orders. The theory we develop follows from 
the premise that growers adopt a marketing order whenever the anticipated gains exceed 
the anticipated costs of establishing and maintaining the order for at least two-thirds of 
the growers, by number or by volume. Therefore, any factor that increases the anticipated 
gains or decreases the anticipated costs of collusion will increase the probability that 
growers will vote in favor of regulation under a marketing order. 
A. Quantity  Restrictions 
An agricultural cartel operates like a dominant firm facing a competitive fringe: the cartel 
can adjust the amount it ships to the fresh market to influence price, while growers 
outside the region covered by the marketing order are price takers. In this subsection, we 
use a simple model of a dominant firm facing a competitive fringe to consider how 
factors that affect the cartel’s ability to use quantity restrictions in the fresh market affect 
the likelihood that the cartel is formed. For now, we ignore the secondary market; it is 
discussed in the next subsection. 
If the cartel restricts quantity in the fresh market then the increase in revenue is 
given by   ∆R =  1 1 2 2 q p q p − ,          ( 1 )  
where  1 p  and  2 p  represent the prices before and after the quantity restriction, and  1 q  and 
2 q  represent the quantities before and after the quantity restriction. Expression (1) can be 
rearranged as follows: 
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where e is the price elasticity of the cartel’s demand curve. The cartel’s demand curve, 
Q(p), can be expressed as follows: 
  Q(p) A Qm(p) − Qf(p) ,          ( 3 )  
where Qm(p) is the fresh market demand curve and Qf(p) is the competitive fringe’s 
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where  m e  is the fresh market elasticity of demand, s  is the cartel’s share of the fresh 
market, and σ  is the competitive fringe’s elasticity of supply. 
  Under the assumption that the likelihood of cartel formation is increasing in ∆R, 
the following testable hypotheses can be generated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood that a cartel is formed is decreasing in the absolute value of 
the fresh market elasticity of demand. 





















, which is positive because  1 2 q q < . Because  0 < m e , this implies that ∆R is decreasing in 
the absolute value of  m e . QED 
  
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood that a cartel is formed by growers in a region is increasing 
in the growers’ market share in the fresh market. 






























which is positive because  1 2 q q <  and  m e −  and σ  are both positive. QED 
  
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood that a cartel is formed by growers in a region is decreasing 
in the elasticity of supply of growers outside the region. 




























which is negative because  1 2 q q <  and  1 0 < < s . QED 
  
Many marketing orders have no provisions for explicit quantity restrictions; these 
rely instead on grade and size standards to increase returns for growers. Quality 
restrictions may effectively restrict quantity. For example, minimum quality standards 
limit the amount of output shipped to the fresh market, and the profitability of 
implementing such restrictions depends in part on the forces outlined in the hypotheses. 
As discussed below in Subsection IIC, different methods for increasing cartel profits have different distributional effects; minimum quality standards may be more acceptable to a 
larger number of growers than explicit quantity restrictions. 
Of course, some quality restrictions do not restrict quantity but are designed to 
raise the average market price in other ways by overcoming informational asymmetries 
between producers and consumers and reducing search and transactions costs. For 
example, grading standards reduce consumer search costs by sorting fresh produce. The 
effects of these types of quality restrictions are discussed further below in Subsection IIC 
in the context of regional heterogeneity.
7 
B.  The Secondary Market 
Restricting supply to the fresh market comes with a cost for cartel members: they must 
either produce below their capacities or find other markets for their excess output. 
Producing much below capacity is unlikely due to the nature of agricultural production 
functions: many of the inputs are fixed during the growing season, such as land and farm 
machinery. Each grower expands production as long as the anticipated market price 
covers average variable costs. 
As a result, the presence of a secondary market is important for reducing the costs 
associated with forming and maintaining a cartel. Without a secondary market, in which 
excess output is either shipped overseas, frozen, processed, or used for animal feed, 
growers have greater incentives to undermine their cartel and ship their excess output into 
the fresh market. It seems reasonable to assume that the larger the secondary market, the 
lower is the impact of shipping excess output on the secondary market price. This effect 
makes the likelihood of cartel formation increase with the size of the secondary market. 
However, there is an offsetting effect: the higher the fraction of output that cartel members ship to the secondary market, the lower the gains from raising prices in the 
fresh market, because any price increase applies to a smaller amount of output. This 
suggests the following testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Suppose that growers in a region ship fraction f of their output to the fresh 
market. There is some critical fraction f 
* that maximizes the likelihood that growers in 
the region form a cartel. 
  
C.  Transactions Costs, the Allocation of the Cartel's Profit, and Regional 
Heterogeneity 
Our analysis in the above two subsections focuses on the cartel as a single unit and 
analyzes factors that affect the profits of the cartel as a whole. While these factors are 
important, a cartel must also find ways to allocate its profits to its various members in a 
way that economizes on transactions costs. Doing so may lead to conflict. For example, 
consider the following scenario. Suppose that there are two major growing regions in a 
state, and that the average qualities (as measured by size, appearance, consistency, and so 
on) in the two regions differ. Will growers be able to agree on which quality restrictions 
the cartel should impose? 
With zero transactions costs within the cartel this problem is simple: choose 
quality restrictions to maximize the joint profits and then divide the profits among 
growers to ensure that each grower prefers being in the cartel to being outside it. 
However, because transactions costs within cartels are positive, the problem is not so 
easily solved: quality restrictions have distributional effects as well as efficiency effects. Because of this, potential cartel members may not be able to agree on the appropriate 
quality restrictions. The likelihood of agreeing depends on how similar the produce of the 
different firms is; as heterogeneity increases the likelihood of agreeing falls. 
Systematic differences among growers are often related to the growers’ locations. 
For a crop grown in a small geographic area, climate, soil, produce quality, and cost 
conditions are not likely to vary much among growers. Such growers are less likely to 
have conflicting interests over a marketing order. Growers in small areas also may find 
communication with other growers less costly than if they were dispersed over a wider 
area. These lower costs of communication make it easier for growers to negotiate the 
terms of the order and to monitor compliance with the order. Furthermore, geographic 
concentration may also capture the effects of cultural homogeneity. All of these factors 
make cartel formation more likely. Alternatively, if there are several distinct subregions 
within a region then growers within the region are less likely to form a cartel. This 
suggests the following testable hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 5: Regions with more than one major subregion are less likely to form a 
cartel because of the transactions costs associated with allocating the cartel’s profits and 
monitoring its members. 
  
D.  The Role of Cooperatives 
Growers in a region may form a cooperative in which they essentially hire a manager to 
manage their shipments of produce to the fresh market. The cooperative may restrict the output shipped to the fresh market or enforce quality restrictions. In this subsection we 
argue that marketing orders are more likely to be adopted when large cooperatives exist. 
There are several reasons why large cooperatives make adoption more likely. 
First, cooperatives often have the incentive to adopt a marketing order. The analysis of 
the dominant firm facing a competitive fringe described above in Subsection IIA applies 
to cooperatives: the cooperative can restrict its members’ output and enforce quality 
restrictions among its members but it has no control over non-member firms.
8 The 
cooperative can use a marketing order to reduce the size of the competitive fringe 
because as long as at least two-thirds of the growers in a region prefer adopting the order, 
the terms of the order apply to all growers in the region. 
Second, under the Act a cooperative can vote on behalf of its members. Thus, it is 
easier for a cooperative to obtain the two-thirds majority required to adopt an order. 
When members of the largest cooperative account for over two-thirds of growers in the 
region, by number or by volume, the adoption decision depends entirely on what the 
cooperative wants. Further, the coalition of cooperating firms may be able to draft rules 
that place non-members at a considerable disadvantage, taking these free riders “to a 
destination that they do not favor.”
9 
Third, a cooperative lowers the transactions costs associated with negotiating, 
monitoring, and enforcing the terms of the order. For example, cooperatives with a 
reputation for supplying high quality produce are likely to have developed effective 
techniques for monitoring quality in their own grading, sorting, packing, and shipping 
operations. To the extent that demand for the whole industry, including the cooperative, 
would increase if other packers used this technology, the cooperative has a strong incentive to have this technology adopted and used by enforcing quality standards. This 
may explain why Sunkist boasts that it shares its technological innovations with 
independent packers.
10 
Fourth, the presence of a large cooperative is an indicator of regional 
homogeneity, which as described in the previous subsection makes adoption more likely. 
The reason why the presence of a large cooperative is an indicator of regional 
homogeneity is that the cooperative has to overcome many of the same problems that any 
cartel needs to overcome. The fact that the cooperative exists suggests that the conditions 
are favorable for cooperation among its members, which means that the members are 
likely to be similar. 
The arguments of this subsection suggest the following testable hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood that growers in a region adopt a marketing order is 
increasing in the market share of the largest cooperative in the region. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
A. Data 
Data were collected for 182 fruit, nut, and vegetable crops grown in California, Colorado, 
Florida, Idaho, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. These states have accounted for the 
majority of marketing orders since 1935; they accounted for 39 of the 44 marketing 
orders operating in 1981 and continue to account for most of the orders today. Each crop 
from each state is treated as a single observation. For example, apricots grown in 
Washington count as one observation; apricots grown in California count as another.
11 The data set includes all crops from the seven states that satisfy two conditions: 1) the 
crop had to be eligible to be regulated under a marketing order; 2) the crop had to have a 
large enough annual harvest to be mentioned in the 1950 issue of Agricultural Statistics. 
The years around 1950 were among the most active periods for marketing orders - many 
marketing orders were adopted within two years after the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act was amended in 1948 to allow growers to use quality standards even 
when prices exceeded parity levels.
12  
The hypotheses presented in Section II are tested using several probit models. 
Five different dependent variables are used that vary according to how long growers were 
able to maintain their marketing order. The measures take the value 1 if the crop was 
marketed under a marketing order for at least: 1) 1960-1995; 2) 1965-1995; 3) 1960-
1981; 4) 1965-1981; 5) at least three consecutive years since 1940.
13 
Several independent variables are used. Hypothesis 1 is tested using elasticity, the 
absolute value of the estimated price elasticity of demand in the national fresh market. 
The measures are primarily from Camm (1976), who obtained national level estimates 
from numerous industry sources.
14 
Hypothesis 2 is tested using share, the state’s share of annual fresh market output 
of the crop. Share is computed from the figures given in Agricultural Statistics. Wherever 
possible, a ten-year average from 1939-48 is used to minimize any bias arising from 
freezes or other anomalies. Imported crops are excluded from the calculation of market 
share because data on imports is not available for most crops in the sample.
15 
Hypothesis 3 is tested using yearsb, the number of years before new acreage 
comes into bearing; it is a measure of barriers to entry. Direct measures of the elasticity of supply of competing firms are unavailable. If yearsb is high it is more difficult for 
firms to enter or expand. Vegetable crops like potatoes, tomatoes, beans, and onions take 
only one season to grow. Deciduous fruits, citrus fruits, grapes, and nuts require several 
years of cultivation before the trees or vines bear marketable produce. Growers of fruits 
and nuts thus have an even stronger incentive to seek regulation through marketing orders 
than vegetable growers. The number of years required for each fruit and nut crop was 
gathered from agricultural sources and the Federal Register. 
  Hypothesis 4 is tested using fresh, the fraction of the state’s crop that is marketed 
to the fresh market. As noted above in Subsection IIB, the theory predicts that there is a 
value of fresh that maximizes the likelihood of forming a cartel. Therefore, both fresh and 
fresh
2 are used in the estimation below. Fresh is computed from the figures given in 
Agricultural Statistics. 
  Hypothesis 5 is tested using regions, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
there is more than one major growing region in the state. A region consists of one county 
or a contiguous group of counties that accounts for at least 20 percent of the state’s 
production. Regions are taken to be distinct and geographically separate if (1) they are 
identified as such in USDA or other agricultural publications, or (2) if they can be 
identified by examining county statistics in the Census of Agriculture. 
  Hypothesis 6 is tested using coop, the market share of the largest cooperative in 
the state. Large cooperatives are easily identifiable, in part because of their familiar brand 
names such as Sunkist, Diamond, and Sun-Maid. Obtaining precise information on 
cooperatives’ market shares, however, is fairly difficult because cooperatives view this 
information as confidential. USDA sources are careful not to report figures on cooperative marketing when doing so might reveal the identity of a particular association. 
The Federal Register only rarely reveals market share information. Benton, Steen, 
Macklin, Knapp, and Farrell provide market share for cooperatives during the 1920s.
16 
Since then, cooperatives typically do not publish their market shares. For each crop in the 
sample, the largest estimate of cooperative market share was used. Where no market 
share information could be obtained for a crop, that crop was assigned a cooperative 
market share of zero. While this method produces a somewhat noisy series, it produces 
reasonable estimates of the extent of cooperative marketing for each crop in the sample. 
The summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The statistics show that most of 
the states did not adopt a marketing order, and those that did often abandoned it. For 
example, only 15% of the observations had marketing orders in place from 1960-1995, 
and only 33% of observations had marketing orders in place for at least three consecutive 
years since 1940. This establishes that even if it is legal to form a cartel it is often 
impossible to form one and sustain it. 
B.  Probit Estimation Results 
The interest group theory provides a hypothesized relationship between the likelihood of 
observing a federal marketing order and the independent variables described above: 
  
Pr{adoption} = f (elasticity, share, yearsb, fresh, fresh
2, regions, coop). 
  
This relationship is estimated using several probit models. The estimation results are 
reported in Table 2. The results are presented in order of how long the firms were able to 
maintain their marketing order; in the first column the dependent variable is 1 for crop/states that maintained their marketing order from 1960-1995 and in the last column 
the dependent variable is 1 for crop/states that maintained their marketing order for at 
least three consecutive years since 1940. 
The signs on the coefficients are in accordance with the theory’s predictions in 
every case except for the coefficient on the elasticity in the first column. Thus, the results 
support the theory’s hypotheses. However, many of the estimates are quite noisy; in the 
first two columns only the coefficient on yearsb is significant. As the time period for 
sustaining the cartel is reduced (moving from left to right in the table) the estimates 
become more precise, and in the last column all of the coefficients are significant. 
As noted above in Subsection IID, if members of the largest cooperative account 
for at least two-thirds of the growers by number or volume then the cooperative is 
decisive in the decision to adopt a marketing order simply because of the voting rule. 
Therefore, it is of some interest to determine whether the theory’s hypotheses are 
supported when the largest cooperatives are removed. 
Table 3 repeats the estimation from Table 2 after removing decisive cooperatives 
(those with market shares larger than 66%) from the sample. Only 13 observations are 
removed, but the effects on the results are interesting. The signs are the same as in Table 
2, but many of the estimates are more precise. For example, in the first column the 
coefficients on yearsb, fresh, fresh
2, and coop are all significant. As in Table 2, the 
estimates become more precise as the time period for sustaining the cartel is reduced. 
  Table 4 reports the marginal effects of each independent variable on the 
probability of adopting a marketing order. The most precise estimates, those associated 
with the last column in Tables 2 and 3, are used to compute the marginal effects; the results from the two tables are similar. The marginal effects are computed at the mean 
values. 
  Table 4 shows that all of the independent variables have substantial effects on the 
likelihood of adopting an order. Using the estimates in the first column, increasing the 
absolute value of the price elasticity by .5 reduces the probability of adopting an order by 
10 percentage points. Increasing the state's share of the fresh market by 20 percentage 
points increases the probability of adopting an order by seven percentage points. 
Increasing the years to bearing by five years increases the probability of adopting an 
order by 40 percentage points. Changing the fraction of output marketed to the fresh 
market has almost no effect on the probability of adopting an order at the mean values; 
this suggests that the mean value of fresh, 73.93, is approximately optimal for order 
adoption. If a state has more than one major growing region then the probability of 
adopting an order is reduced by 17 percentage points. Finally, increasing the market share 
of the largest cooperative by 20 percentage points increases the probability of adopting an 




The research presented in this paper addresses the questions of how, why, and where 
cartels operate. Because agricultural marketing orders are legal cartels they provide a 
unique opportunity for testing hypotheses about cartel formation. The empirical results 
show that growers in a region are more likely to form a cartel when demand in the fresh 
market is inelastic, the growers have a large market share in the fresh market, crops have long cultivation times, the fraction of output shipped to the fresh market is neither too 
small or too large, growers are regionally concentrated, and large cooperatives exist. 
One issue that we have not explicitly examined is the termination of marketing 
orders, but we believe that the variables that we have analyzed can be useful in 
explaining decisions to terminate. Over time if firms earn profits above the norm then 
other firms will find ways to compete. Variables such as the elasticity of demand and the 
share of output shipped to the fresh market may change as substitutes emerge. Smith 
(1961) describes this phenomenon in the market for lemons: as the technology for 
manufacturing and marketing premade lemonade became available the demand for fresh 
lemons became more elastic and the share of output that producers shipped to the fresh 
market dropped to well below half. According to our analysis both of these changes 
would increase the probability of abandoning the order, and the order has in fact been 
abandoned. 
  More generally, future work could examine the timing of cartel formation and 
disbandment and also consider which variables each cartel controls. As noted above in 
Section IIA, marketing orders vary: some provide for explicit volume restrictions, most 
provide for quality controls, and some provide for research and development or 
advertising. The dynamics of how cartels form, disband, and make choices would be 
interesting to analyze empirically. The interest group approach used herein could likely 
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attitudes towards free riders on the fringe: “There are a few who do not participate in this 
endeavor to make the date industry of greater value. We grumble at holding the umbrella 
for their benefit. Some members resent the participation in the benefits of our cooperative 
program of a minority who do not contribute toward the cost of market development and 
advertising. More serious is the disrupting influence on the orderly distribution and 
marketing of our dates by this minority grading or selling dates in a manner or at a price 
that does not conform to the general industry program. We hope they will see the value of                                                                                                                                             
united effort and join with us. If not, the benefits are so obvious to the rest of us that we 
propose to carry on and make the date industry continue a successful agricultural 
enterprise despite the attitude of a few who are unwilling or unable to comprehend the 
basic principles and purposes of cooperative action.” William W. Cook, Report of the 
United Date Growers of California (1942). The free rider problem faced by cooperatives 
is also discussed in U.S. Department of Agriculture, A Review of Federal Marketing 
Orders for Fruits, Vegetables, and Specialty Crops: Economic Efficiency and Welfare 
Implications (Technical Report, Agricultural Marketing Service, Agricultural Economic 
Report No. 477, 1981). 
9 George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action, 5 Bell J. Econ. and Management 
Science 359 (1974). Recent research on regulations that impose standards supports 
Stigler’s conjecture. Most research has focused on industry-wide environmental and 
safety standards and has shown regulations that set standards do not normally impose 
compliance costs uniformally across firms. See, for example, Michael Maloney and 
Robert McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J. Law 
& Econ. 99 (1982); George Neumann and Jon Nelson, Safety Regulation and Firm Size: 
The Effects of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 25 J. Law & Econ. 183; B. 
Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being Protected?, 
28 Econ. Inquiry 551 (1985); Ann Bartel and Lacey Glen Thomas, Direct and Indirect 
Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA’s Impact, 28 J. Law & Econ. (1985); Scott 
Fuess and Mark Loewenstein, Further Analysis of the Theory of Economic Regulation: 
The Case of the 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 33 Econ. Inquiry 354 (1990). 
Regulation that imposes costs on all firms in an industry, but which forces some of the                                                                                                                                             
marginal firms to exit, leaves the inframarginal firms better off. Furthermore, it is often 
the inframarginal firms that are instrumental in crafting the regulations. 
10 C.H. Kirkman, The Sunkist Adventure (1975). 
11 Ideally, we would allow for the fact that marketing orders can go across state 
boundaries or cover only part of a state. However, the available data is measured at the 
state level so we treat each crop in each state as a single observation. 
12 Parity is a measurement of the purchasing power of a unit (for example, a bushel) of 
farm product. 
13 The sources for these measures are U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 8; Neff 
and Plato, supra note 5; Kenneth Farrell, Marketing Orders and Agreements in the U.S. 
Fruit and Vegetable Industries, in Organization and Competition in the Fruit and 
Vegetable Industry (Technical Study No. 4 of the National Commission on Food 
Marketing, 1966); Murray Benedict and Oscar Stine, The Agricultural Commodity 
Programs (1956); Farrell, Kenneth R., Federal and State Enabling Legislation for Fruit 
and Vegetable Marketing Orders: Evolution and Current Status (Supplement No. 3 to 
Technical Study No. 4 of the National Commission on Food Marketing, 1966), and the 
Federal Register. 
14 Frank A. Camm, Political Exchange and Marketing Orders (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Univ. of Chicago 1976). Re-estimating demand elasticities would have been 
possible, but of questionable value. Bruce L. Gardner, Causes of U.S. Farm Commodity 
Programs, 95 J. Pol. Econ. 290 (1987) estimated demand elasticities for 17 commodities 
simultaneously using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regressions technique. Gardner 
concludes that elasticity estimates obtained from prior studies give more “reasonable”                                                                                                                                             
values, but produce results that are qualitatively the same. Camm did not report an 
elasticity for potatoes; we use Gardner’s. The results do not change if we drop potatoes 
from the analysis. 
15 Even if the data were available, including imports in the calculation of market share 
may not be appropriate for the purpose at hand. Whenever a marketing order establishes 
grade and size standards, these standards apply to imported crops as well. While 
competition from imports can undermine a cartel, it also motivates firms to seek 
regulation to control the flow of these imports. Thus, the market share of imports has an 
ambiguous effect on the likelihood that growers adopt a marketing order. 
16 Alva Benton, An Introduction to the Marketing of Farm Products (1926); Herman 
Steen, Cooperative Marketing: The Golden Rule in Agriculture (1923); Theodore 
Macklin, Efficient Marketing for Agriculture: Its Services, Methods, and Agencies 
(1921); Joseph G. Knapp, The Rise of American Cooperative Enterprise: 1620-1920 
(1969); and Farrell, Marketing Orders, supra note 13. Table 1. Summary Statistics (182 observations) 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
      
Dependent Variables      
      
1960-1995  0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
1965-1995  0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
1960-1981  0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
1965-1981  0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
At least three years since 1940  0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
      
Independent Variables      
      
Elasticity  0.64 0.41 0.10 1.90 
Share  31.04 33.29 0.00  100.00 
Yearsb  2.69 2.33 1.00 9.00 
Fresh  73.93 34.51 0.00  100.00 
Regions  0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
































 Table 2. Determinants of Marketing Order Adoption (182 observations) 













       

















































































       
Log Likelihood  -51.18 -64.82 -57.03 -53.87 -66.60 
Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
-72.71 -84.63 -100.66  -106.01  -115.38 
 


























 Table 3. Determinants of Marketing Order Adoption when Cooperatives with market shares greater 
than 66 are removed from the sample (169 observations) 













       

















































































       
Log Likelihood  -49.08 -50.17 -54.85 -50.25 -63.68 
Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
-69.05 -75.88 -83.45 -88.82 -100.84 
 

























 Table 4. Marginal Effects of the Determinants of Order Adoption, Computed at the 
Mean Values (Dependent Variable: Adopt for at least three years since 1940) 
  Table 2  Table 3 




    





















Total Effect of Fresh  -0.00085 -0.00041 









* Significant at the 10% level       ** Significant at the 5% level       *** Significant at the 1% level 